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Looking across studies on the ability of price promotions to increase a brand's sales, one sees that 
the power of that instrument varies across brands, categories, retail chains, and markets. These 
differences in promotional price elasticities  have  been shown to be systematically  related to 
marketing policy. We add to this body of research in two ways. First, we broaden the focus to also 
consider  the  relationships  between  marketing  policy  and  baseline  sales.  Second,  we use  an 
analytical  multi-segment  model  of  market  response  to  develop  hypotheses  about  the  likely 
relationships  between marketing policy and promotional price elasticities  and baseline sales. 
Using weekly store sales data for three cleaning product categories, we find coefficients consist- 
ent with the hypothesized relationships. Interestingly, for almost all elements of the marketing 
mix we find that those elements that tend to be associated with higher levels of promotional price 
response tend also to be associated with lower levels of baseline sales. National advertising share 
of voice is the only element that does not follow this pattern. Higher levels of national advertis- 
ing tend to be associated with higher levels of promotional price response and higher levels of 
baseline sales. Managerial implications are discussed. ©  1998 Elsevier Science Ltd 
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I. Introduction 
Economic and marketing theory tells us that, in allocat- 
ing  a  budget  across  the  marketing  mix,  a  manager 
should invest more in instruments with higher elastici- 
ties  than  he  or  she invests in  instruments with  lower 
elasticities.  (Carpenter  et  al.,  1988;  Dorfman  and 
Steiner, 1954; Gatignon and Hanssens, 1987; Jagpal and 
Brick,  1982; Lambin,  1970). Such advice assumes (1) 
that elasticities and unpromoted 'baseline' sales levels 
are  fixed,  i.e.  'exogenous constants' and  (2)  that  the 
particular budget allocation chosen has no impact on 
future response. 
However, these assumptions are likely to be incorrect. 
Both the elasticity of a  brand  and the  baseline  sales 
at the aggregate level are a function of (1) the distribu- 
tion  of  price  elasticities  across  consumers  who  buy 
the  brand,  and  (2)  the  number  of  consumers  who 
consider the brand for choice. The premise of this study 
is that marketing policy (i.e. the level of promotional 
and  advertising  support  for  the  brand)  affects these 
determinants of elasticities and baseline sales.  Hence, 
elasticities and baselines are are assumed to be neither 
exogenous nor fixed but rather are a function of market- 
ing policy. 
We focus our study on promotional price elasticities.' 
These elasticities are typically  quite large in absolute value. 
Associated sales increases  may range from three-fold to 
seven-fold  (Blattberg and Neslin,  1990,p. 351). Further, 
these elasticities differ  across brands, categories, and markets 
(Blattberg and Wisniewski,  1987; Wittink et al., 1987) and 
differences between elasticities are related to manufactur- 
ers' and retailers' marketing policies (Bolton, 1989). 
Our contribution to this evolving literature is two-fold. 
First, we provide a causal framework to explain the relation- 
ships between manufacturers'  and retailers' marketing poli- 
cies on the one hand and promotionalprice elasticities on 
the other. Second, we also use that framework to consider 
the relationships between these marketing policies  and 
unpromoted, baseline sales levels. The insights from this 
theoretical analysis could cause reconsideration of the 
traditional budget  allocation process.  For  instance,  if 
marketing actions taken  today cause  the  structure  of 
response to change such that unpromoted, full margin, 
t Promotional price elasticities reflect response to short term price reduc- 
tions that are accompanied by retailer promotional support: a  feature 
advertisement in the retailer's weekly ad, a special display (sign at point 
of purchase, free-standing platforms/bins, end of aisle shelves, etc.), or 
a coupon. It is important to note that most price changes that occur in 
supermarkets today are promotional price changes. 
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baseline sales are diminished in the future, those market- 
ing actions may bear reconsideration.  Finally,  secondary 
contributions  of our paper  are  (1)  that,  in  contrast  to 
Bolton (1989),  we estimate the impact of policy variables 
on elasticities using a  single  stage estimation procedure 
and (2) that our larger database, combined with the single 
stage estimation  allows us more precision in estimation 
than Bolton had. 
We study the impact of marketing policy on the evolving 
pattern  of market response through  a  three step process. 
First, we specify a cross-sectional, time series model of the 
general  form  Q = up/3, where both  13, promotional  price 
elasticity, and a, a surrogate for baseline sales, are functions 
of brand and category descriptors that are manifestations of 
manufacturers' and retailers' marketing policies. 
In the second step, we specify directional hypotheses for 
the coefficients of brand and category descriptors in the 
eft.)  and  13(.) functions.  We  use  a  consumer  response 
framework to derive analytical expressions for a brand's 
expected promotional price elasticity and expected baseline 
sales.  The signs of derivatives of these expressions with 
respect to relevant parameters yield directional hypotheses 
for the coefficients in the ct(.) and 13(.) functions. 
In the final step, we estimate the parameters of the tx(.) 
and 13(.) functions with 52 weeks of scanner data from 15 
stores for brands in three categories of cleaning products. 
The  signs  of estimated  coefficients are consistent  with 
hypotheses suggested by the  analytical  model.  We find 
that for most elements of the marketing mix, those actions 
which tend to increase the degree of promotion response 
tend to also lower the level of baseline sales. Only national 
advertising breaks this pattern.  Increased use of national 
advertising is associated with higher levels of promotional 
price response and higher levels of baseline sales. 
In what follows we present, in Section 2, the empirical 
model and, in Section 3, the analytical model used to gener- 
ate hypotheses about signs of parameters in the empirical 
model.  We  then  report  the  empirical  findings  in  Sec- 
tion 4.1. We subsequently discuss, in Section 5, the manage- 
rial  implications of our study and conclude, in Section 6, 
with directions for future research and the limitations of our 
study. 
2. Empirical model 
While we cannot directly observe manufacturers' and retail- 
ers' marketing policies during the period relevant to our 
data, we can observe manifestations of those policies.  We 
focus on policy manifestations at the brand level and at 
the category level. At the brand level we consider a brand's 
average price, market share, the frequency and depth of its 
price cuts, the frequency with which it is displayed,  z and 
2 Our data also contain information on feature advertising in the retail- 
ers' weekly ads.  Unlbrtunately, the  occurrence  of these feature ads is 
highly correlated with in-store displays. The correlation between feature 
and display is 0.44 at the brand level, and 0.77 at the category level. To 
avoid problems of multicollinearity we dropped the data on features. 
its share of voice in national advertising. At the category 
level we look across all brands in the category and consider 
the frequency and depth of price cuts and the frequency 
with which the category is displayed. 
We propose that marketing policies at one point in time 
can affect the structure of market response at a later point 
in  time.  Ideally,  then,  we would take manifestations  of 
marketing policies at one point in time and relate them to 
promotional price elasticities and baselines estimated at a 
later  point  in  time.  Because of data  limitations  we are 
forced to relate policy manifestations for the 52-week period 
of our data to elasticities and baselines estimated with the 
same 52 weeks of data (see, eg Bolton, 1989, for a similar 
approach).  We assume  that  the  marketing  policies  are 
reasonably stable during the relevant periods of time and 
that the estimated elasticities and baselines have impounded 
these policies.  Because our analysis is cross-sectional as 
well as time serial we get the variability needed to identify 
relationships  by looking across brands,  categories,  and 
stores. 
Following the general  structure developed by Bolton 
(1989) in her study of the relationship between marketing 
policies and promotional price elasticities,  we propose the 
following structure for the empirical modeP. 













C-DISPLAY,  r 
STOREr 
CATEGORY,. 
= unit sales of item i in store r at time t 
= price of item i at store r at time t 
= dummy variable indicating that item i was displayed 
in store r at time t 
= %  + a I  "(PRICEir) + a2"(SHAREir ) + a 3. 
(B - ACTIVITYi,.) + a4-(B - DISPLAYir) + a 5. 
(B - MADVTGi) + a6'(C - ACTIVITY, r) + a 7" 
(C - DISPLAY r) + a 7 +/(STOREr) + a23 + c' 
(CATEGORY,.) 
= b 0 + b I "(PRICEir) + bz'(SHAREir)  + b 3" 
(B - ACT1VITYir) + b4'(B - DISPLAYir) + b s" 
(B - MADVTGi) + b6"(C - ACTIVITY,.,.) + b 7" 
(C - DISPLAYcr) + b 7 +/(STORE r) + b23 + ," 
(CATEGORY,.) 
= average price for item i in store r, divided by the 
weighted average price for all items in i's category in 
store r (weights are market shares) 
= log of i's market share in store r times the number of 
SKUs in i's category in store r 
= coefficient of variation for i's price in store r 
= percentage of weeks that item i was on display in 
store r 
= LNA share of voice for item i 
= weighted average of the coefficients of variation of 
price for items in category c in store r (weights are 
market shares) 
= percentage of weeks that category c was on display 
in store r 
= dummy variable indicating rth store 
= dummy variable indicating cth category 
We tbllow Bolton  in  the definition of  the  variables of the empirical 
model. 
26 Model  (1)  has  the  property  that  the  coefficient of 
log(Pin), ~(.), is the promotional price elasticity.  4 Further, 
the function et(.)  can be interpreted as a  surrogate for 
baseline  sales.  While the  exact  value  of tx(.)  will  not 
necessarily correspond  to  the  exact value  of baseline 
sales, changes in ct(.) should correspond directionally to 
changes in baseline sales. 
The term 8"D,r, in model (1) is included to control for 
the impact of display, leaving 13(.) to capture uncontaminated 
measures  of response to promotional price cuts.  If the 
effects of promotional display versus promotional price 
cut were not disentangled, then the incremental sales increase 
caused by displaying a brand when its price is cut would 
be captured in b 4, biasing its value toward greater negativ- 
ity (see, eg Inman et al.,  1990). 
To  develop  hypotheses  regarding  the  likely signs  of 
parameters al-a 7 and bl-b 7,  we develop, in contrast to 
Bolton (1989), a single analytical framework that suggests 
the  ways  in  which  the  policy  manifestations might  be 
related to baselines and promotional price elasticities. 
3. An analytic framework 
Using disaggregated shopping data from nearly 20 000 
households, Leo Burnett USA identified a set of generic 
shopping  strategies and used it to exhaustively classify 
those households' purchase patterns in more than 25 product 
categories (Olson and McQueen, 1995; Progressive Grocer, 
1995). Setting aside the 'Light User' strategy,  5 we reorgan- 
ize the Leo Burnett shopping strategies to yield: 
-- Not Promotion Sensitive: These consumers may find 
only one brand in a category acceptable (a Leo Burnett 
'Long Loyal'), or they may find several different brands 
in a category acceptable (a Leo Burnett not promotion 
sensitive 'Rotator'). These consumers do not react to 
promotional offers. The 'Rotators' buy different brands 
to accommodate different family members, occasions, 
or purposes. 
-- Promotion Sensitive: These consumers let promotional 
offers determine which of the acceptable brands will be 
chosen (a Leo Burnett 'Promotion Sensitive Rotator'). 
If no acceptable brand is promoted, these consumers 
will pay full price for one of the acceptable brands. 
4 Our choice of a fixed model tbrm represents a departure from Bolton, 
who estimated both (1) and a strictly linear model on each brand. Bolton 
then selected the model lbrm which provided the best fit to the estima- 
tion data. Approximately one-half of Bolton's elasticity estimates were 
derived from the linear model. It should be noted that elasticity estimates 
from the linear model are point specific, ie they will differ at different 
levels of price. While there is some debate over the relative merits of 
linear versus multiplicative models (Brodie and deKluyver, 1984; Ghosh 
et al., 1984; Leeflang and Reuyl, 1984; Naert and Weverbergh, 1985), we 
chose to adopt the multiplicative constant elasticity model (1) because it 
obviates the need to specify evaluation levels of the independent variable 
and because it allows us to pertbrm single stage estimation. 
s We set this segment aside because it is not a shopping strategy. 
Light Usage is not a  buying strategy, per se; it is a reflection of 
limited category interaction...[These light users] generally should 
be removed from analysis so clearer patterns can emerge. (Progres- 
sive Grocer,  1995, p.  138) 
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-- Store Brand Buyers: These consumers typically buy 
store brands. They may, however, buy a national brand 
if it is on promotion (a Leo Burnett 'Price-Driven'). 
To model expected promotional sales and expected unpro- 
moted sales, for a particular national brand, B l, we build 
from the three segments described above.  We represent 
these segments with three prototypical consumers: a regular 
buyer of national brands who is not promotion sensitive, 
a  regular  buyer  of  national  brands  who  is  promotion 
sensitive, and a store brand buyer who may be induced by 
promotion to buy a national brand. 
For tractability we assume that there are two national 
brands, Bj and B  2. We represent preferences for B~ and B  2 
by r~ and (l-n) respectively (0<n<l); and assume that, in 
the  absence  of  promotion,  consumers  choose  between 
brands with probabilities proportional to preferences (Luce, 
1959). We assume that the prototypical consumer in the 
second segment responds to promotion by restricting her 
choice to promoted acceptable brands, and that she chooses 
according to her preferences if both national brands are 
promoted  simultaneously.  Finally,  we  assume  that  a 
prototypical consumer in the third segment will consider 
national brand B t only if B l is on promotion. This consumer 
will never buy any national brand, including Bt, if that 
national brand is not promoted. 
3.1. Expected baseline sales and expected percentage sales 
increase due to promotion 
We translate the behavior of these prototypical consum- 
ers into expectations of sales response by assuming that 
each segment is made up of many replicas of its prototypi- 
cal consumer.  6 Next we derive expressions for the level of 
sales that brand B 1 can expect when it is not promoted 
and the percentage sales increase that it can expect when 
it is promoted. This latter measure is an oppositely signed 
surrogate for elasticity. We denote the number of consum- 
ers in the loyal, the promotion sensitive segment and the 
store-brand segment by N t, N2, and N3, respectively. 
Focusing  on  brand  B I,  we  note  that  its  demand  is 
conditional on whether brand B 2 is promoted or not. If B 2 
is promoted, the brand B~ has a baseline sales of n.Nj, i.e. 
B~ does not sell to any consumers in the promotion sensi- 
tive segment. If B  2 is not promoted, B~ 's baseline sales will 
equal n.(Nl+Nz).Assuming that the  occurrence  of  B2's 
promotions follow a Bernouilli process with parameter p, 
expected baseline sales of B~ is thus equal to: 
EBS = E[B l's Baseline Sales = p-Tr.N I + (1  -  p).~r.(N I + N2)  (2) 
If B l promotes, its sales will once more be conditional 
on  Bz's  promotional  status.  Specifically, when  B  2 also 
promotes, B 1 will sell n.(Nl+N2+N3). When B2, does not 
promote,  B l  will  sell  n.NI+N2+N 3.  Thus,  taking  the 
6 By assuming a fixed number, Ni, of consumers in segment i, we mask 
any  changes in  primary  demand  and  any  effects of seasonality. We 
consider those complexities beyond the scope of this paper. 
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appropriate expectations, the expected percentage sales 
increase of B I, when B I is promoted, is equal to: 
B t's Promotional Sales Peak -  B  I's Baseline 
EPSI---E [  Bl,s Baseline  ] 
N  2+N~  (1  -  71").N  2+N  3 
3.2. Hypotheses 
SHARE. To see the impact of market share on expected 
baseline sales we consider the derivatives of Equation 2 
with respect to re. 
O(EBS) 
a,n"  =N  1 +N2.(I  -- p)>0  (4) 
As one would expect, brands with higher market shares 
should expect higher baselines. 
To  see  the  impact  of  market  share  on  expected 
promotional price elasticities, we use an oppositely signed 
surrogate for elasticities, namely the expected percentage 
increase in  sales when B~  is promoted. We consider the 
derivative of Equation 3 with respect to n. 
cg(EPSI) 
-  (1  -  p)  ¢)rr 
(5) 
N  2  [ (1  -  ,n-).N  2 + N  3 ] -(N  I + N2) 
Higher market share brands should get smaller percent- 
age increases in sales when they are promoted (i.e.  their 
elasticities should be less negative). 
PRICE. We assume that, all else held constant, consum- 
ers who choose brands that are positioned as high priced 
brands are less price sensitive than those consumers who 
choose lower priced brands. Therefore higher priced brands 
should tend to have more Segment 1 (not promotion sensi- 
tive consumers) and lower priced brands should tend to 
have more Segment 2 (promotion sensitive consumers, see 
also Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989)). To see the impact 
of price on baselines, we look at the derivative of Equation 
2 with respect to N~, holding the total number of consum- 
ers in segments 1 and 2 constant at N=N~ +N  2. 
a(EBS) 
8Nj  [NI = Iv -  N  2  = P"tr>0  (6) 
Hence, higher priced brands should be expected to have 
higher baselines, ie the sales of higher priced brands are 
less sensitive to price promotions of others brands all else 
equal. 7 
Similarly, to see the impact  of price on promotional 
price elasticities, we look at the derivative of Equation 3 
with respect to N 1, holding the total number of consum- 
ers in Segments 1 and 2 constant. 
O(EPSI) 
ON  I  ]N~ = N -- N  2  = 
(7) 
p'(N  3 +N)  [ (1  -  7r).(l  -  p) ]  [  +  ] <0  t  Nl2  7r'N 
Hence higher priced brands should expect to have smaller 
percentage increases in sales when promoted, which cor- 
responds to less negative promotional price elasticities. 
B-DISPLAY and B-ACTIVITY. We expect that more 
frequently displayed brands will tend to draw more Seg- 
ment 2 (promotion sensitive) consumers and fewer Seg- 
ment 1 (not promotion sensitive) consumers. Therefore, to 
look at the impact  of display frequency (B-DISPLAY) 
and  the volatility of prices (B-ACTIVITY) on baseline 
sales and promotional price elasticities we consider the 
derivative  of  Equation  2  with  respect  to  N 2,  holding 
N I+N2=N constant. To look at the impact of these vari- 
ables  on promotional price elasticities,  we consider the 
derivative  of  Equation  3  with  respect  to  N>  holding 
NI +N2=N constant. 
Since N2=N-N  1,  we refer to the  analysis  above that 
considered the derivative of Equation 2 and Equation 3 
with respect to N~, and predict that brands that are displayed 
more frequently and that have more volatile prices should 
have lower baselines  and  larger percentage increases in 
sales due to promotion (more negative promotional price 
elasticities). 
C-DISPLAY  and  C-ACTIVITY.  These two category 
descriptors reflect the extent to which a category receives 
promotional  support.  We believe that  those consumers 
who buy brands from highly promoted categories are more 
promotion sensitive than consumers who buy brands from 
categories that are infrequently promoted. 8 To investigate 
the  impact  of  these  variables  on  baseline  sales  and 
promotional price elasticities we would once again look at 
the derivatives of equations and with respect to N2, hold- 
ing N~+N2=N constant and conclude that higher values 
of these variables should be associated with lower baselines 
and higher percentage increases in sales due to promotion 
(more negative promotional price elasticities.) 
B-MADVTG. National advertising can have two differ- 
ent effects (Mitra and Lynch, 1995): differentiation effects 
(Bain, 1956; Boulding et al., 1992) and information effects 
(Erdem and Keane,  1996; Stigler,  1961).  The differentia- 
tion effect suggests that advertising insulates a brand from 
competitors' marketing activities by making consumers 
less  sensitive to those  actions.  We capture this  'market 
power' effect in our framework by assuming that some of 
the promotion sensitive consumers are converted to non 
7 We are not hypothesizing  that higher priced brands have positive  price 
elasticities. Instead, higher priced brands are assumed to signal higher 
quality and will under ceterisparibus  conditions  have less price sensitive 
consumers. Thus price promotions of other brands should have less 
impact on the baseline sales of higher priced brands. 
s It happens that a category is frequently promoted in one store and 
almost never promoted in another. We suggest that more promotion 
sensitive consumers  will tend to buy this category  in stores  that promote 
the category  more frequently. 
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ing N=N1+N2  constant.) As shown above, this leads to 
higher baselines and smaller percentage increases in sales 
due to promotion. 
The information effect or consideration set effect sug- 
gests that advertising can cause some consumers who do 
not have the advertised brand in their acceptable set to 
consider it when promoted (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1989; 
Mitra and Lynch, 1995). Within our framework this can 
be modeled as a sales increase stemming from Segment 3, 
those consumers who were previously not considering BI. 
Notice that this effect differs from effects described earlier 
in that (1) it applies only to promotion periods, and (2) the 
increase in the size of the promotion sensitive segment is 
not offset by a parallel decrease in the size of the promo- 
tion insensitive segment. 
To examine the impact of the consideration set effect 
on baselines and promotional price elasticities we look at 
the derivative of Equation 3 with respect to N 3, the number 
of consumers in the store brand segment. 
~(EBS) 
--  -  0  (8) 
{)N  3 
,and 
~(EPSI)  _  p  +  l-P>o  (9) 
rgN  3  N 1  7r.N 
We see that the two roles of advertising drive elasticities 
in different directions. Market power tends to dampen 
elasticity, while consideration tends to enhance elasticity. 
Table I summarizes the hypothesized effects. 
4.  Estimation 
4.1. Data and estimation procedure 
Fifty-two weeks of scanner sales data were drawn from 16 
stores representing five different chains in a Midwestern 
market.  Three  different categories  were  selected:  two 
household cleaning product categories and one personal 
care product category. National advertising share of voice 
data was drawn from Bar LNA. 
We do not aggregate items to the brand level because 
preliminary investigation revealed that promotional activ- 
ity was often size-specific.  This results in 27 brand-size 
items of Household Cleaning Product  I,  64  brand-size 
Table 1 Hypothesized sign of the coefficients of the variables in this study 
Variable  in et(.)  in I~(.) 
Brand-specific  covariates 
PRICEIr  +  + 
SHAREir  +  + 







Category  specific policy variables 
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items of Household Cleaning Product 2, and 25 brand- 
size items of the Personal Care Product. In total, we have 
1243  store-brand-size  combinations (ie  1243 series  of 
52 weeks of data). All items are nationally marketed, ie 
there are no store brands in these data. 
4.2. Empirical results  ~ 
The estimation results in Table 2 are consistent with our 
hypotheses. High share brands tend to have higher baselines 
(positive coefficients in the ~(.) function) and less elastic 
demand (positive  coefficients in the 13(.) function) than 
low share brands. The same holds for high priced brands, 
where the high price positioning of these brands is presum- 
ably related to higher levels of quality. We also hypothesized 
that  increased promotional activity affects the  mix  of 
consumers for a brand. More specifically, the higher levels 
of promotional activity will tend to be associated with 
brands that have a higher percentage of promotion sensi- 
tive consumer in their franchises.  This will cause lower 
baseline sales and more elastic demand than brands that 
promote less. We indeed find that the effect of promotion 
(DISPLAY and ACTIVITY variables)  on baseline sales 
and price elasticities is negative. 
For advertising (B-MADVTG), we hypothesized that 
baseline sales should be higher for advertised than for 
unadvertised brands,  and,  indeed, see  that  the coef- 
ficient of B-MADVTG in the a(.) expression is posi- 
tive. The relationship between B-MADVTG and elasticity 
could have gone either way; the market power effect 
dampens elasticity while the consideration set effect 
heightens  elasticity.  For  this  data,  we  see  that  the 
consideration effect dominated and that higher levels 
of advertising are  associated with higher degrees  of 
elasticity (the coefficient of B-MADVTG in  the 13(.) 
expression is negative). 
5.  Discussion 
Because our empirical analysis is cross-sectional, we can- 
not directly test the causal hypotheses generated in "3.2. 
Hypotheses". Our correlational findings are nonetheless 
all consistent with the causal hypotheses. 
It is, however, possible that the direction of causation 
goes both ways. We consider two cases explicitly.  First, 
for the DISPLAY and ACTIVITY variables, opposite 
causality may be consistent with certain implications of 
normative economic theory. Brands that are more promo- 
tion price elastic should promote more frequently. Further, 
since frequent price promotion might lead to lower aver- 
age prices,  this normative link between elasticity and 
promotion  frequency  might  also  in  part  drive  the 
9 We will  not discuss comparisons with the Bolton (1989) analysis in 
depth.  One difference with Bolton (1989) that should be mentioned 
though is that while Bolton's work gave inconclusive (insignificant)  results 
about  the  role  of  C-ACTIVITY,  B-MADVTG,  B-DISPLAY  and 
C-DISPLAY, our larger data set, exploited with single stage estimation, 
shows strong significant effects of  these four latter variables and  an 
additional one (B-ACTIVITY). 
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Table 2 Estimation results  ° 
Effect on baselines sales, (t-ratios)  Effect of promotional price elasticity,  (t-ratios) 
Constant  a o  0.000 a  b o  -0.908 (-8.87) 
PRICE  aj  1.581  (44.53)  b I  0.030 (1.69) "'~ 
SHARE  a 2  0.913 (202.34)  b 2  0.034 (19.07) 
B-ACTIVITY  a 3  -0.148 (- 11.34)  b 3  -0.028 (-5.01 ) 
B-DISPLAY  a4  -0.873 (- 14.29)  b 4  -0.234 (- 10.35) 
B-MADVTG  a5  0.919 (20.09)  b s  -0.343 (- 14.22) 
C-ACTIVITY  a 6  -2.808 (-8.13)  b6  - 1.259  (-4.68) 
C-DISPLAY  a 7  -0.060 (-0.82) "~  b 7  -0.123 (-2.96) # 
Store Dummies 
Category dummies 
I  a 8  -0.340 (-8.51)  b x  -0.008 (-0.38) '~'~ 
2  a 9  -0.589 (- 14.71)  b9  -0.005 (-0.23) ''~ 
3  aH~  -0.124 (-2.95) b  bto  -0.008 (-0.37) "' 
4  at i  -0.519 (- 16.42)  bn  -0.020 (- 1.25) "'' 
5  al2  -0.020 (-0.52) "  bl2  -0.020 (-0.96) "' 
6  a13  -0.752 (-24.14)  b13  -0.068 (-3.99) 
7  at4  -0.767 (-19.95)  bl4  -0.046 (-2.38)" 
8  al5  -0.560 (-19.91)  bl5  -0.020 (-1.15) ''~ 
9  al~  -0.962 (-46.05)  b16  -0.055 (-4.57) 
10  a17  -0.761  (-28.88)  b17  0.060 (2.91) h 
11  als  -0.311  (-16.33)  bls  -0.048 (-6.09) 
12  a19  -0.784 (-44.14)  bly  -0.019 (-2.48) " 
13  a2o  -0.654 (-24.58)  b2o  -0.025 (-2.45) ' 
14  a21  - 1.366  (-62.39)  b21  -0.067 (-7.49) 
15  a22  -2.161  (-86.84)  b22  -0.095 (-9.42) 
16  a23  0.000 d  b23  0.000 a 
1  a24  5.290 (80.15)  b24  -0.774 (-8.24) 
2  a25  -3.548 (-21.99)  b25  -0.788 (-8.43) 
3  ¢/26  0.430 (2.95) b  b2,  0.000 a 
Main sales effect 
DISPLAY  ~  0.872 (51.23) 
~R2--0.758,  n-48 614, all parameters are significant at the 0.0001  level unless noted. Note that the elasticities are negatively signed. Hence negatively 
signed coefficients enhance the elasticities. 
b Significant at the 0.01  level. 
'  Significant at the 0.05 level. 
a Fixed to zero to set a metric. 
n.~ Not significant. 
hypothesized relationship between price and elasticity. 
On the other hand, we argue that frequently promoted 
brands draw a more promotion sensitive consumer base 
and that therefore promotion price elasticity is enhanced 
by the frequency of promotion itself. Subsequently, this 
more negative elasticity may attract a larger portion of 
the  marketing  budget  to  support  even more frequent 
promotions. Hence, most likely causation goes both ways 
in  the  link  between promotional  price elasticities and 
promotion frequencies. 
The rational of opposite causation for advertising vari- 
ables is less clearly sensible.  Should brands that are more 
promotion price sensitive be more heavily advertised? The 
Dorfman-Steiner  theorem  suggests  the  opposite,  ie  it 
predicts that we need to observe lower price sensitivities 
with higher levels of advertising (see also Boulding et al., 
1992; Carpenter et al.,  1988; Dorfman and Steiner,  1954). 
Thus, we believe that reverse causation can not be a strong 
argument to explain our empirical results with respect to 
the advertising effects. 
In a  descriptive sense,  our results bear an  interesting 
interpretation of asymmetric promotion effects. Blattberg 
and Wisniewski (1989) argue that the asymmetry in promo- 
tion effects is due to heterogeneity in willingness to pay for 
higher quality. They find that consumers who normally 
buy higher  priced  national  brands  rarely  switch  down 
when lower priced store brands are promoted, while consum- 
ers who buy lower priced store brands often switch up to 
promoted national brands. 
Assuming that brands in higher priced tiers are more 
frequently advertised than brands in lower priced tiers, 
our results indicate that advertising may very well offer 
an alternative explanation  for the asymmetric switch- 
ing  effects discovered  by  Blattberg  and  Wisniewski. 
Namely, within  the confines of our data, brands that 
are advertised have higher baselines and more negative 
30 elasticities.  This  means that  these  brands  (1)  do  not 
portray a large sensitivity to promotions of other brands, 
and  (2)  are  successful  in  attracting consumers  from 
other brands. 
Impact of marketing policy 
one assumes (see, eg Dekimpe and Hanssens, 1996). Finally, 
we are investigating relatively stable and mature categories 
of which it could be argued that the selling parties charge 
relatively stable regular prices. 
6. Conclusion 
Promotional price elasticities are typically  larger, in absolute 
value, than elasticities for other elements of the marketing 
mix. Following the economic framework of Dorfman and 
Steiner  (1954),  a  marketer  would  therefore  allocate  a 
disproportionate percentage of his or her marketing budget 
to promotional price cuts. A quantity that is not considered 
in the traditional economic analysis is baseline sales. Accord- 
ing to our framework, a brand's baseline sales is smaller in 
the face of a marketing policy that allocates large percent- 
ages  of the  budget to  promotional activity. Hence, the 
traditional allocation rule's blindness to the impact of the 
allocation rule on future response can lead to a policy that 
drives out high margin, unpromoted sales. This implica- 
tion is powerfully reflected in the following quote from 
Business Week: 
[l]n category after category, brand managers are scrambling 
to  boost  quarterly sales  instead  of investing in  image 
advertising to nurture brands for the long haul. To pump 
sales, they're shifting marketing dollars from ads into pro- 
motions...Many marketing experts  believe  that  such 
strategies--carried to an extreme--run the risk of damag- 
ing valuable  brand franchises  that enable marketers  to 
price their products  at a premium. (Landler et al.,  1991) 
We  have  attempted  to  model  the  effects of marketing 
pglicy on promotional price elasticities and baseline sales. 
Due to data limitations and pending unresolved issues in 
intertemporal aggregation, we have not been able to test 
our framework with time-ordered descriptors of causes 
and effects. This  is  a  potential  limitation of our  study 
because cross sectional associations between variables do 
not  rule  out  reverse  causation  or  constant  elasticities. 
However, in this paper,  we offer theoretical support for 
why elasticities should vary with policy variables. Further, 
the pattern  of effects we obtain empirically follow our 
predictions and can not be reconciled with the normative 
implications  of constant elasticities. Nonetheless, more 
research is warranted. 
For instance, a limitation of our study is that we assume 
marketing mix variables to be exogenous. Recent research 
in economics and marketing suggests that this may lead to 
biased estimates of market response (Berry et al.,  1995; 
Villas-Boas and Winer,  1996).  Given the cross-sectional 
nature of part of our data, we can not test for endogene- 
ity. Further, it is not likely that shifts in demand will have 
instantaneous effects on, for instance, advertising or pric- 
ing given observation lags and coordination issues in the 
retail channel. The existence of such response and observa- 
tion lags and the lack of knowledge about their distribu- 
tion makes the analysis of the endogeneity problem difficult 
to attain in the current context as the inferred cause and 
effect relationships will be sensitive to the causal ordering 
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